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Abstract 
This paper uses patient-level pooled cross sectional data from the National Ambulatory Medical 
Care Survey (NAMCS) to study the impact on the adoption IT systems in the health industry 
(namely stand alone offices) in the form of Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems. It also 
examines what physician characteristics make adoption more probable.  When looking at patient 
visits from the years 2005-2010, an OLS model shows that full EMR systems increase patient 
visit time by about 3%, however there is reason to believe that these results are biased due to 
endogeneity in the EMR variable. Because EMR systems are not randomly assigned to physician 
offices, there is likely a link between the type of patients a physician serves, and that physician’s 
choice to adopt EMR systems. After using instrumental variables and a two stage least squares 
regression, I am able to show that the adoption of EMR systems decreases patient visit time by 
24.2%. The IV and 2SLS show that endogeneity exists within the EMR variable, and in fact 
EMR systems are not to blame for the increase in patient visit time that appears to occur from 
EMR adoption.   
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I. Introduction 
It is obvious that technology is playing a large role in nearly all aspects of life in the 
United States. Up until recently however, the medical field has been slow to adopt IT systems in 
comparison to other industries due in part to high initial costs and slow financial returns 
(Christensen 2007).  While the economic benefits of adopting health IT may not be large, the 
social benefits that patients receive from Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) is thought to be 
significant, and thus the driving force behind EMR adoption.  Throughout my research, I 
examine the effect of EMR adoption on the time a patient spent with a physician per visit in an 
office setting.  While it is intuitive that EMR systems would increase physician efficiency 
through a reduction in paper work (for notes, labs, prescription orders, imaging etc.), a simple 
OLS model of patient visit time on EMR systems shows the opposite. While analyzing data from 
visits in 2005-2009 with an OLS regression, full EMR systems increased the time of a visit by 
3%.  Although the results are statistically significant, they cannot be trusted completely due to 
omitted variable bias and endogeneity in the EMR variable.  A 2SLS model and instrumental 
variables correct for some of the endogeneity in the EMR variable shows that the use of EMR 
systems actually decreases patient visit time by over 24%.  Throughout this paper, I analyze how 
efficiency changes with the adoption of EMR systems, model a physician’s probability to adopt 
EMR systems, and use instrumental variables to control for some of the bias in the EMR variable 
in order to better understand the impact of EMR systems on patient visit time.  
The push for EMRs started in 2004 when President Bush set a goal that every American 
would have an Electronic Medical Record by 2014.  That push was continued shortly after 
President Obama took office as part of the HITECH Act of 2009. The HITECH Act includes five 
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goals that were established to make medical care better for the patient.  The five goals are as 
follows: 
a. Ensure privacy and security precautions for personal health information. 
b. Improve population and public health. 
c. Improve care coordination.  
d. Engage patients and families. 
e. Improve quality, safety, and efficiency and reduce health disparities.   
 
Goals C and E are the driving forces in my research. This study assesses whether or not EMR 
adoption substantiates the goals of the HITECH act.  Another aspect of the HITECH is the 
federal mandate that requires every patient to have an EMR by the end of 2014 or the 
office/hospital will face fines.  By modeling a physician’s choice to adopt EMR systems before 
2014, I am also able to predict what physician characteristic will lead to a successful (efficient) 
EMR adoption, once that adoption is mandatory (Hoggle 2011).    
Through my research I hope to assess whether or not EMRs improve efficiency, and 
determine what physician characteristics increase the probability of adopting EMR systems. 
While there are many different ways to measure efficiency, I look at the length of time a patient 
spends with a physician.  It cannot be explicitly said that shorter appointments are better than 
longer appointments because aspects such as severity of the patient’s reason for visit and how 
thorough the physician’s examination is could cause to longer visit times, and that would be a 
good thing.  However, when comparing visits that are identical in all ways except for the use of 
EMR systems one can see if the EMR systems increase or decrease visit time.  If there is a 
decrease in time solely due to EMR systems, it can be said that the systems are efficient (it can 
also be said that EMR systems are inefficient if the systems cause an increase in time) because 
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doctors would be able to treat more patients in a given period of time.  Additionally, it is 
important to note that efficiency could be different for different types of patients.  For example, 
EMRs may be more beneficial to patients who regularly see a doctor for a chronic illness versus 
those who only come in for a minor illness as needed.  Furthermore, I examine at what physician 
characteristics increase the probability of adopting EMR systems prior to the HITECH Act. The 
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) should be a sufficient data set to model 
the previously listed questions.  
This paper is beneficial because there have not been many high quality economic studies 
about EMR adoption.  Many of the studies completed thus far have simply looked at the cost 
benefits of adopting EMR system, and not the social benefits.  Furthermore, those studies have 
taken place at the hospital level, versus the office level.  One study published in Applied 
Economics in 2014 examined the effects of EMR adoption on the time a patient spent with a 
physician and the quality of care the patient received.  One large problem with the study was that 
only 4720 observations were used, all of which came from 2008.  The data I will be using is a 
pooled cross section that contains patient visits from 2005-2009 and over 170,000 observations 
in total.   My data is able to show change over time, and benefits from the large amount of 
observations.  My contributions show the impact of EMR systems on patient visit time, provides 
a probability function on the physician level for adopting EMR systems, and most importantly 
controls for some of the endogeneity in the EMR variable using instrumental variables and a 
2SLS model. The 2SLS results contradict some previous studies that claim EMR systems are 
inefficient, however those studies did not take any efforts to control for endogeneity in the EMR 
variable.  Finally, without surprise, doctors who primarily use more data and testing in their 
normal visits (such as cardiologists) are more likely to adopt EMR systems than those who do no 
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(such as psychiatrists). The remainder of the paper is broken into eight sections as follows: 
literature review, theoretical model, empirical model, data, results, conclusion, appendix (which 
contains all tables and graphs), and references.   
II.  Literature Review  
Although Economists have spent a lot of time studying the effects of IT adoption in many 
different business sectors, those effects have not been analyzed much in the health care industry 
yet since IT adoption has been slow.  Michael C. Christensen and Dahlia Remler (2007) explain 
that the hesitation to adoption IT systems in the health industry is mostly due to network 
externalities and uncertainty in returns (they also note that over time barriers to adoption should 
decrease and lead to a better outcome for all stakeholders).  However, due to the HITECH act of 
2009, EMR adoption is starting to become a hot topic in economics.  Because health cannot but 
valued in a purely monetary sense, it is often times hard to measure the impact of EMR systems, 
and whether or not that impact is positive. So far, much of the focus has been on the cost impact 
of adopting EMR systems, specifically on a hospital level.  Other studies have also examined 
what hospital characteristics impact EMR adoption, how EMR adoption impacts the length of a 
patient’s visit, and if EMR systems have an impact on the quality of care a patient receives.      
  David Dranove, Chris Forman, Avi Goldfarb, and Shane Greenstein (2014) seek to 
examine the high cost of EMR systems, and at what point in time after adoption such systems 
would become economically efficient.  As with multiple other findings, they find that initially 
the operating costs increase when EMR systems are adopted.  This study suggests that the initial 
cost of EMR systems range from $25,000 to $45,000 per physician with operating cost of up to 
$9,000 a year.  Furthermore, it is found that urban hospitals suffer initial cost as much as $9 
million for adoption and $1.35 million for yearly operating costs.  Dranove et al. use data from 
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the HIMSS (Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society) survey, along with data 
from the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) annual survey and US Census and US County 
Business Pattern data.  This paper stands out from others, due to the fact that it follows the cost 
effects of EMR adoption from the time of adoption to years down the road. After separating 
EMRs into different categories based on capabilities, the study also set up a large amount of 
controls to better assess the change due to such EMR systems.  Controls include hospital level 
controls from 2009 (natural log of inpatient days and of outpatient visits), fixed hospital effects 
from 1996 (such as number of beds, ownership, births, Medicare/Medicaid patients etc.), and 
county level controls from 2000 (such as population, age proportion, race, education level, and 
income). Here the dependent variable of interest is operating expenses per admission, and it was 
modeled with data obtained from Medicare Cost Reports. A linear regression with ln(costs) was 
used for the analysis. The results of this study are not all that surprising; hospitals in IT intense 
areas saw a significant 3.4% cost decrease three years after adopting basic EMR systems, and a 
marginally significant 2.1% drop in cost three years after adopting advance EMR systems.  
Hospitals in non-IT intensive areas still suffer cost increases even years after EMR adoption.  
While the article does a good job of assessing the rise or fall of cost to examine the efficiency of 
EMR systems, it only examines the rise or fall of costs on a hospital level, not an office level.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to measure whether or not there are other societal benefits from 
adoption, aside from cost effectiveness driving hospitals to adopt.  As Dranove et al. did for their 
study; I will be using a linear regression model to look at the effects of EMR adoption on the 
length of time a patient spent with a physician.  I will also use many of the same controls as this 
study did, but just in a slightly different way (which will be discussed in section six).  
Laurence C. Baker, Kate Bundorf and Daniel Kessler (2014) published a NBER working 
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paper in which the effect state laws that cap copy fees for patient records are analyzed.  
Throughout the paper two main questions are examined: how do copying caps1 affect the 
competition in the health care market and how do copying caps affect adoption of EMRs.  Both 
of the questions above are addressed on a hospital level.  The first main question embodies the 
patient’s propensity to switch doctors based on whether or not the state that patient lives in an 
area that has a law that caps the copy cost for patient records. Using MarketScan claims data 
from 2001-07, matched with data on state laws and data on physician markets and the Area 
Health Resource File (AHRF, 2001-2007) the contributors were able to assess the how the 
patients propensity to switch doctors changed with state copy caps, and how the cost of medical 
care changed as a result of copy caps.  In short, copy caps made patients more likely to switch 
physicians due to a decrease in cost in obtaining their medical records.  To build off of the 
question of how patients would respond to caps, the paper next looks at how hospitals respond to 
caps, particularly in the form of EMR adoption.   The theory behind a hospital’s response to caps 
is that when hospitals cannot charge over a certain amount for paper records, they loose the 
incentive to use paper.  Data from the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society 
(HIMSS) along with previously mentioned data was used to model the probably of adopting 
EMR systems.  Not only does the model account for state laws, but it also provides insight into 
general reasons a hospital chooses to adopt EMR systems.  The model used to predict EMR 
adoption is as follows:  
EMRkct =αc +γt +θWkct+βXct+δLct +εkct 
where subscripts k,c,t correspond to hospital, county, and year respectively. Alpha and gamma 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Copying caps are defined as the maximum amount of money a physician’s office can charge a 
patient for a copy of his/her medical records.	  	  	  2	  Data and codebooks are available at http://www.nber.org/data/national-ambulatory-medical-
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are county/year fixed effects, while W, X, and L are a set of hospital characteristic, time varying 
county characteristics, and an indicator of a state law capping copying costs.  It was found that 
hospitals in states with copy cap laws were 8% more likely to adopt EMR system than other 
states.  Moreover, for-profit hospitals are less likely to adopt EMRs while teaching hospitals are 
more likely to adopt.  For the purposes of my study, state copy caps will not be included because 
it does not change other characteristics of the hospital after EMR adoption has taken place.  
Additionally, I will be looking at EMR adoption in physician offices and other smaller medical 
centers, not hospitals.  By adjusting the model I will be able to see what qualities in a physician 
make it more probable to adopt either full or partial EMR systems.  Because the data I am using 
only ranges from 2005-2010 (all visits range from years 2005-2009), I look at physicians who 
switched to EMR systems voluntarily, not because of the federal mandate.  The physician 
qualities that make it more probable to adopt EMR systems will likely be predictors for what 
qualities will lead to successful adoption after the federal mandate is put in place.  
Finally, much of my research will be based of a study done by Christopher S. Brunt and 
John R. Bowblis (2014). There paper asks three key questions in regards to EMRs: what 
physician/practice attributes are associated with EMR adoption, how does EMR adoption change 
the physician’s productivity, and how does EMR adoption change the quality of care a patient 
receives.  The article uses data from the 2008 Restricted Health Tracking Physicians Survey 
(HTPS) that surveyed of 4720 physicians nation-wide. After excluding medical students, federal 
employees, foreign medical graduates temporarily allowed to practice medicine in the United 
States, and physicians who spent less than 20 hours a week on direct patient care, 1211 
observations were kept.  Key variables used in the study include whether or not EMRs are used, 
time spent per patient, number of patients seen per week, physician’s gender, physician’s race, 
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physician’s age, years in practice, income level, ownership in practice, types of patients treated, 
if the physician accepted Medicare/Medicaid, hours on administrative tasks a week, quality of 
care given to patients, and geographic region among multiple other controls.  When analyzing 
physician characteristics associated with EMR adoption, a linear probability model was used 
with EMR as the dependent variable.  The results for the types of physicians who chose to adopt 
EMRs are not surprising: age, income, practice size, practice type, and a rural location all played 
significant roles in physician’s choice in adopting EMRs. It was found that a 5% increase in 
years of age decreases full EMR adoption by 22%, Pediatricians were 16.9% less likely to adopt 
than family care doctors, physicians earning more that $150,000 a year were 11-13% more likely 
to adopt than physicians earning less than $100,000 a year, physicians in rural areas were 15.5% 
less likely to adopt and large practices (6 physicians or more) were over 15% more likely to 
adopt full EMR system than practices with only 1 or 2 physicians.  To analyze physician 
productivity, either amount of time spent per patient or number of patients seen per week were 
used as the dependent variable.  Holding all other factors constant, physicians who adopted full 
EMRs reported spending on average 2.8 minutes more per patient and seeing 7 fewer total 
patients per week.  There is no significant evidence that EMR adoption affected the quality of 
care a patient received.  While this article does a good preliminary job at analyzing the effects of 
EMR adoption, there are some limitations that need to be addressed.  The HTPS survey is not 
panel data or a pooled cross section; it only surveys the physician one time in 2008.  From the 
survey, there is no way of knowing how long a physician has had EMR systems or how 
efficiency changed over time.  Instead of using data from only one year, I have data from 2005-
2010.  The data I am using has over 35 times as many observations as the sample Brunt used. 
Although I do not have panel data, I am able to model how EMR efficiency changes over time 
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using interaction terms between the year and type of EMR system in place.  The authors also 
admit that the EMR variable is likely endogenous, and that precautions were not taken to control 
for that.  In my research, I use instrumental variables and a 2SLS model to begin to control for 
the endogenous EMR variable. Even though I am not able to capture all of the unobserved 
variables associated with physician output and EMR systems, this is a step in the right direction.  
My hope is to be able to overcome many of the limitations that Brunt et al. faced in their 
research.  
III. Theoretical Model 
Mark Pauly published one of the fundamental economic models for health 1980.    In 
Pauly’s model, even though physicians are income maximizers, they still seek to satisfy the 
patient’s objective(s).   Pauly’s model for health production is as follows: 
H = H (M1,M2;H0) 
Here H is the amount of Health, M1 is the input produced by the physician using his own time 
(such as office visits or surgeries), M2 is priced health input (such as prescription drugs or in-
patient hospital care), and H0 is an initial endowment of health.  Today M1 can also include 
emails between patients and physicians as well as other EMR functions.   A physician’s goal is to 
maximize the patients’ utility that consists of H health, and other goods X.  The patients’ utility 
function is as follows:  
U=U(X,H) 
Today, EMR systems would play a role in that H through M1.  One of the physician’s roles is to 
see if adopting EMR systems would increase the patients utility through health or not.  An 
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updated production model for health that includes the use of EMRs would look something like 
this:  
H=βX+αEMR+ε 
In this model, H is still a measure of health, X are all of the observed variables that go into health 
(such as patient, physician, and office characteristics), EMR is an indicator variable for EMR 
systems, and ε is an error term.  Here H could be measured with patient visit time, quality of care 
received, patient recovery time etc.  If H is measured in terms of quality of care, efficient EMR 
systems would show HY>HN (where Y indicates the presence of EMR systems, and N indicates 
the absence of EMR systems).  If H is measured in patient visit time or patient recovery time, 
efficient EMR systems would show want HY<HN.  
 After looking at the health production function that includes EMR systems, it is necessary 
to look at two different physician profit functions, one that shows profit with the presence of 
EMR systems, and one that shows the profit without.  Such profit functions are as follows:  
ΠY=P*HY-c(HY)-c(EMR) 
ΠN=P*HN-c(HN) 
  
In those functions, the subscript Y indicates the use of EMR systems, while N indicates the 
absence of EMR systems.  Π is profit, P is the price per unit of health, H is health, and c 
indicates cost for health with/without EMR systems and then the cost of the EMR system itself.  
Although c(HY) may be more expensive than c(HN), offices that use EMR systems are likely to 
offer more health, and may offer that health at a higher price.  Once the EMR systems become 
cost effective, c(HY)< c(HN)  is expected.   In order to decide whether or not to adopt EMR 
systems, a latent variable model is used where: 
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EMR*= ΠY – ΠN  or  EMR*=[ P*HY-c(HY)-c(EMR)] – [P*HN-c(HN)] 
EMR=1 if EMR*>0 
EMR=0 otherwise. 
Prior to the adoption by law, physicians are assumed to only adopt EMR systems if EMR*>0.  It 
is important to note that X and ε are contained in EMR* due to HY/N.  While only about 18% of 
medical expenditure in 1978 went to payments for physician’s services, Pauly notes that this 
small amount provides the financial incentive for physicians to determine the majority of 
resources, outputs, and costs in the health field.  If that still holds true today, prior to the 
HITECH act, physicians should have played a large role in deciding whether or not to adopt 
EMR systems.  Their choice prior to the federal mandate will be important in modeling what 
physician characteristics are best suited for EMR systems after adoption is mandatory.  
IV. Empirical Model  
Based on the modified theoretical model for health, I have established the following 
empirical model: 
TIMEpht= β0 + β1EMRht + β2 Xpt + β3  Wht +θt +εpht 
where p,h,t correspond to patient, physician, and year respectively.  TIME is the amount of time 
the patient spends with the physician, EMR is a vector where “No EMR system” is the base, and 
“full EMR system” or “partial EMR system” are the other two options, X is a set of patient 
characteristics, W is a set physician characteristics, θ is year fixed effects represented by dummy 
variables for year 2005-2009 (with 2005 as the base), and ε is the error term which is likely 
correlated with the EMR variable. Because EMR systems are not assigned randomly to 
physicians, one must assume (prior to the federal mandate), that physicians chose the systems 
because they wanted them. It is likely that there is some reason for choosing the systems, such as 
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severity of patients seen and skill level of physicians, that makes physicians who choose to adopt 
EMR systems, and also have longer patient visit times.  The time variable is modeled two ways; 
the first way it is in its original format (discrete values ranging from 0-240 minutes), then 
because this variable seems to have a natural log distribution versus a normal one, it is also 
modeled by taking the natural log of the time plus one minute.   X contains patient age, race, 
reason for visit (such as pre/post surgery), and patient payment method (such as private 
insurance).  W includes physician specialty (such as cardiology), region of office (such as South), 
type of office (such as private practice), and ownership status of office (such as 
physician/physician group).  I also use a model that includes an interaction term between year of 
visit and type of EMR system used. Each interaction coefficient may be compared to a visit in 
2005 where no EMR system was in place.  All cases in Table 7 are modeled using the OLS 
functional form with robustness checks.  It is important to note that while the results from the 
OLS models are significant, there is reason to believe that those results may be biased due to 
endogeneity in the EMR variable.    
In order to correct for the endogeneity in the EMR variable, instrumental variables and a 
two stage least squares regression is used.  The first stage of the 2SLS models physician 
characteristics that make it more likely that physician to adopt EMR systems.  This comes from 
the latent model that describes a physician’s choice to adopt EMR systems.  The model is as 
follows:  
EMRht = β0 +β1Wht+ β2Tht + θt +εht 
In this model, the subscripts h,t are for physician and year respectively. W is a set of physician 
characteristics, T is a set of technology characteristics that does not directly play a role in the 
amount of time a patient spends with a physician, θ is year fixed effects represented by dummy 
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variables for year 2005-2009 (with 2005 as the base), and ε is the error term.  Physician 
characteristics include physician specialty, region, practice ownership status, and type of practice 
(these are the same variables used in the model for time).  Technology characteristics include the 
type of electronic billing used (full, partial, or none) and the ability to do email consultations 
with patients.  The probability of using an EMR system is modeled using the Probit model.   
Even though the data will model the probability of choosing an EMR system, it will also be able 
to show what physician characteristics will be beneficial when that physician adopts due to the 
Federal mandate and not by choice.   
Finally, after computing both models, instrumental variables and a 2 stage least squares 
regression is used to control endogeneity in the EMR variable.  My goal is to control for the 
unobservable reasons that cause certain physicians to choose EMR systems, and in turn make 
those systems either efficient or inefficient. If the coefficient on the EMR variable changes with 
the use of instruments, it can be concluded that the original results are biased (assuming that the 
instruments are valid). One instrument that could be used is a variable that shows the physician’s 
comfort level with technology. Since that particular variable is not available in the data set 
electronic billing and e-mail consultations act proxies for a physician’s reasons for favoring 
technology.   
V. Data  
I will be using data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, a survey 
conducted by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health 
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Statistics2.  While the survey ranges from 1973-2012, I will only be looking at the years 2005-
2010. The variable survey question the status of the physician’s EMR system was not asked until 
2003, however that question was improperly coded for the years 2003 and 2004. The survey, 
which is randomized across the country, was given to physicians for a one-week period.  During 
that time, the physician answers question both on his/herself and practice, and on the patients in 
order to get more reliable results. While the survey is answered on a physician level, entries are 
reported on the patient visit level.  Only visits to non-federally funded “office based, patient 
care” are included in the survey. Each year of the data is collected independently from all other 
years.  The data is in the pooled cross sectional format. While there are a total of 177,240 
observations in the sample, there are only 175,969 observations for the variable EMEDREC (for 
a yearly breakdown of observations, see Table 1in the appendix).  
NAMCS is a well-established, reliable data set.  Sample design descriptions, variable 
descriptions, and the codebooks for each year provide a clear insight into how the survey was 
conducted and how each variable should be used.  The NAMCS data also provides many 
strengths in comparison to other surveys. First and foremost, data containing information on 
electronic medical records is extremely hard to come by since EMR systems have only been 
introduced in recent years and many private practices and hospitals are not required to release 
data.  It is valuable in that it offers a large number of observations each year, and that the same 
questions are asked year after year.  While panel data would have been much more ideal to 
follow how physicians individually adjust to EMR adoption over time, the pooled cross section 
still allows researchers to study the overall change over time.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Data and codebooks are available at http://www.nber.org/data/national-ambulatory-medical-
care-survey.html.	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While this seems to be the best data source available at the time, it does not come without 
some challenges. There are no location or county codes, so it is not possible to obtain county 
characteristics from other data sources.  Another problem is in the fact that only non-federally 
funded office-based patient care facilities are surveyed. While physicians working in hospitals 
were not represented at all, 82.5% of the patients in the sample were seen in a private solo or 
group practice.  Another possible problem is with the TIME variable (time patient spent with 
physician).  This is a discrete variable top coded at 240 minutes.  The top code should not have 
too much of an impact, seeing as only .04% of the time observations were top coded.  I also 
include a model that uses lnTIME as the dependent variable, because time seems to be 
distributed in the natural log form.  To correct for times of 0 minutes, the variable generated is 
actually ln(TIME+1).  Missing values also do not cause many problems in the data set.  The key 
independent variable, EMR, has .7% missing values.  Other categorical variables either did not 
have missing values, or the response “blank” was recoded and grouped with “other” in data 
analysis.  I am looking at time as a measure of physician efficiency because cost and accuracy 
variables are not available in the data set.  There have already been studies assessing the cost 
impacts of EMR systems, however there have not been any studying better patient outcomes, i.e. 
more efficient visits, more accurate diagnosis, quicker recovery times, or lower mortality rates.  
Because the NAMCS data does not include any information on accuracy of diagnosis, recovery 
times, or mortality rates, I use patient visit time as to examine EMR efficiency.     
I have already touched on the fact that TIME, time the patient spent with the physician, is 
the dependent variable.  For the full data set, the mean time the patient spent with a physician is 
20.58 minutes.  That time fluctuates between 20 and 22 minutes year to year, in no specific 
pattern.  Finally, the average time a patient spends with a physician changes depending on the 
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type of EMR system the physician is using. It is interesting to note that when only looking at 
type of EMR system and average time, partial EMR systems have the lowest average time a 
patient spends with a physician.  See Figure 1 and Table 2a-2b in the appendix for a description 
of TIME.   
The variable EMR is the key independent variable for this study.  EMR is a categorical 
variable that describes the type of EMR system in place.  Choices are Full EMR, Partial EMR 
(part electronic, part paper), or No EMR and Blank.  For purposes of my analysis, I replaced all 
“Blank” answers as missing values.  Each year the percentage of physicians using EMR systems 
in some capacity increases. It is also interesting to look at the breakdown of EMR usage by 
physician specialty.  While Cardiologists have the highest percent of EMR usage at 55% usage, 
psychiatrists only have 21% usage.  Those results make sense, seeing as Cardiology involves 
many high-tech tests and imaging while psychiatry does not.  See Tables 1, 3 and 4 in the 
appendix for a better description of the EMR variable.  A description of other variables used in 
the analysis along with a set of summary statistics is included in the appendix in tables 5 and 6.  
VI. Results and Findings 
 
After running the regressions, one thing is clear from the beginning; EMR systems have a 
significant impact on the length of time a patient spends with a physician.  Although the results 
from the OLS models show a that EMR systems have a significant impact on patient visit time, 
the results are likely biased due to endogeneity in the EMR variable.  When looking at the 
baseline model for the impact of EMR systems on the natural log of patient visit time, full 
systems increase the time the patient spent with the physician by almost 3% in comparison to no 
EMR systems.  There is no significant impact of partial EMR systems on the natural log of 
patient visit time.    Although each year had a significant impact on time, there is no pattern in 
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yearly time changes (later years were not more efficient as one might expect).   Also as expected, 
in comparison to patients being seen for a new condition, pre/post surgery patients’ visits times 
are 11% shorter and patients on routine visits for a chronic condition had 5% shorter visit times. 
That result could show that while EMR systems are not necessarily efficient for first time 
patients, they do become efficient for that particular patient after his/her original visit.   Once the 
interaction term was introduced, visits in 2005 with full EMR systems are shown to be the most 
efficient.  This result is very surprising and could be due to the endogeneity in the EMR variable.  
When compared to the base cell, 2005 and no EMR system, all other years and combinations are 
less efficient.  The magnitude of inefficiency (in comparison to the base cell) did not follow a 
pattern for years 2006-2009.  These results can all be found in Table 7a-b in the appendix.  
In order to model the physician’s decisions to choose EMR systems, I use three separate 
probit models (Results can be found in Table 8).  I use three different dependent variables in the 
probit models; the first is EMRA (=1 if full system or partial system is in place), followed by 
EMRF (full system) and EMRP (partial system).  In comparison to 2005, the probability to adopt 
any system or a full system increased each year, however there were not yearly increases for 
partial systems.  If office owners felt as if they would be required to have full EMR systems in 
the near future, it is likely they would not adopt partial systems; instead you would expect them 
to go ahead and adopt full systems.  Furthermore, in comparison to family/general physicians, 
cardiologists were the most likely to adopt EMR systems in every model and psychiatrists were 
the least likely to adopt in each model.  Both of these results validate the theory that physicians 
whose jobs require analyzing more quantitative data (such as numerical test results or imagining) 
are more likely to adopt EMR systems versus those whose jobs require a qualitative analysis of 
their patients.   When a physician or group of physicians owns the practice, the probability of 
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adopting full EMRs is the lowest.  Those physician’s may feel as if they are already running their 
practice efficiently and therefore do not want to deal with the hassle of adopting EMR systems.  
As far as region is concerned, offices in the West are the most likely to adopt EMRs in every 
model.  I believe that could be partly due to the fact that Silicon Valley is located in the West, 
and the West in general seems a step ahead of the rest of the country in terms of technology 
usage.   Finally, offices with electronic billing methods and email consultations were more likely 
to adopt EMR systems across the board.  Those two results are important because they hint at 
physicians’ preferences for technology and that there may be heterogeneous effects for EMR 
systems.   Physicians who are comfortable with or enjoy using technology should be more likely 
to adopt EMR systems.  Moreover, those same physicians should be more efficient when using 
EMR systems versus physicians who are not comfortable with technology.  
The two stage least square model uses electronic billing and e-mail consultations as 
instruments to capture some of the endogeneity in the EMR variable.  Electronic billing and 
email consultations act as proxies for some other unobserved variable that causes physicians to 
favor technology.  In order to use these instruments, it needs to be assumed that there is no 
correlation between a physician’s technology preferences and the type of patients the physicians 
sees.  Electronic billing is a categorical variable where 1=full electronic billing system in place, 
2= partial electronic billing system in place, and 3= no electronic billing system.  The sample is 
made up of 67% full systems, 24% partial, and 9% no electronic billing system.  E-mail 
consultations is a dummy variable where 1=yes the physician uses e-mail to communicate with 
patients.   Only 7% of physicians surveyed communicated with patients via email. In the 2SLS 
model, I use the variable EMRA again (=1 if either full or partial EMR systems are in place) as 
the key independent variable.  The results show that endogeneity does exist in the EMRA 
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variable.  Prior to using the 2SLS model, the presence of any type of EMR system increased visit 
time by about 2%.   After running the 2SLS model with EBILLREC (electronic billing) and 
ECONR (e-mail consultations) as instruments for EMRA, the presence of any type of EMR 
system actually decreased visit time by 24.2%.  I also ran the 2SLS model with only electronic 
billing as the instrument for the EMR variable, and then again using only e-mail consultations as 
the only instrument.  Both of those regressions show that once again, there is endogeneity in the 
error term.  All results from the 2SLS model can be found in the appendix in Table 9.  When 
electronic billing is the only instrument used, any form of EMR system decreases patient visit 
time by 23.9%.  Additionally, when e-mail consultations is the only instrument used, any form of 
EMR system decreases patient visit time by 58.1%.   While all of the effects of EMR systems on 
time are significant in all models, it can be concluded that electronic billing status is a stronger 
instrument than e-mail consultations (this could be due in large part that only 7% of physicians in 
the sample use e-mail consultations).  It is important to note that while these instruments are 
good, it is possible that better instruments may be found down the road in different data sets.  
There might still be unobserved variables that both cause physicians to have higher patient visit 
times, and to have EMR systems.  It is nearly impossible to pick up all of the endogeneity in the 
EMR variable.   
VII. Conclusions 
The 2SLS results are very important in my research.  Not only do they show that there is 
endogeneity in the EMR variable, but the results also combat previous findings that EMR 
systems are inefficient (in terms of patient visit time).  Through out previous research, the 
endogeneity in the EMR variable seems to have been overlooked.  Such endogeneity may be the 
reason that OLS (and other similar models) show that EMR systems cause an increase in patient 
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visit time.  Without controlling for endogeneity, a 3% increase in time makes the systems look 
inefficient.  The biased inefficiency results are a likely reason that some professionals are 
hesitant to adopt the systems.  That being said, the adoption of electronic medical records is more 
or less inevitable because of the HITECH Act, and an overall increase in technology throughout 
all industries.  The data shows new EMR systems were being added every year the years 2005-
2009; such new systems could be part of the reason why efficiency did not increase over the 
years (in the OLS model or in the 2SLS model). The 2SLS regression offers up very interesting 
results.   When adding in electronic billing and email consultations as instruments for EMR 
systems, EMR systems actually decreased the time of a visit by 24.2% (this result was significant 
at the 1% level).  Much endogeneity exists in the EMR variable.  It is not EMR systems alone 
that increase the time of visit, but rather other unobserved variables.  Such variables could be the 
type of patients the physician treats or how long the system has been in place.  Electronic billing 
and e-mail consultations are used as instruments in my research because I think that they are the 
best suited instruments my data set provides.   
It is important to note that when looking at the results of my research, they are all for 
patient visits in office settings, not hospital settings.  While it is likely that similar results would 
occur when studying the effects of EMR systems on hospital visit times, there are some 
differences in the two visits.  Office visits tend to be shorter than hospital visits since in general 
longer, more advanced procedures and testing takes place in a hospital setting. I hypothesize that 
the sign of the impact of EMR systems on time is the same for office visits as hospital visits, but 
those impacts might have different magnitudes.   In future studies, panel data would be most 
beneficial in studying the effect of adopting EMR systems on physician efficiency.  Being able to 
follow a particular physician over time would allow researchers to observe how the benefits of 
Flinn,	  	  	  23	  
EMR systems changed (grew) over the life of the EMR system. Panel data would also remove 
some of the endogeneity in the EMR variable if the physicians continued to see the same type of 
patients year after year.   It would also be beneficial to have dependent variables other than the 
amount of time a patient spent with a physician to measure the social benefits of EMR systems.  
Such benefits could include one for the quality of care received, patient recovery time, patient 
mortality rates with certain diseases, detection time of certain diseases etc.   Once better data is 
available for the use of EMR systems, more in-depth economic analysis of the systems will be 
possible.  Year after year, the amount of EMR systems used in physician offices and hospitals 
are growing.  The longer these systems are around, the better economists will be able to 
understand the impact EMR systems are making in the medical world.   
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VIII. Appendix  
 
Table 1: Yearly Observations 
Total Observations Observations including EMR Variable  
Year of Visit Frequency Full EMR Partial EMR No EMR Total 
      2005 25,630 3,004 3,530 18,789 25,323 
2006 29,542 4,759 3,655 21,029 29,443 
2007 32,425 6,961 5,112 20,267 32,340 
2008 57,713 15,912 10,560 30,677 57,149 
2009 31,930 10,312 6,003 15,399 31,714 
      Total 177,240 40,948 28,860 106,161 175,969 
 
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
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Figure 1: Distribution of time 
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All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
N=177,240 
This figure shows how the time a patient spent with a physician is distributed.   
In the graph, the time variable is top coded at 100 minutes.  
In the data set, time is top coded at 240 minutes, mean=20.58 min, std.dev.=13.89 min   
The graph shows that the variable takes on a natural log shape versus a normal one.  
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Table 2a: Mean Time by EMR System 
 
Table 2b: Mean Time by Year of Visit 
EMR System Mean Time 
 
Year of Visit Mean Time 
Full EMR 20.758 
 
2005 20.110 
Partial EMR 20.496 
 
2006 21.330 
No EMR 20.525 
 
2007 20.355 
   
2008 20.842 
Total 20.579 
 
2009 20.010 
     
   
Total 20.579 
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
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Table 3: Break down of EMR System Type by Year of Visit 
Year of Visit 
EMR System  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
       Full EMR 12% 16% 22% 28% 33% 23% 
Partial EMR 14% 12% 16% 18% 19% 16% 
No EMR 74% 71% 63% 54% 49% 60% 
       Total 25,323 29,443 32,340 57,149 31,714 175,969 
 
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
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Table 4: Break down of EMR usage by Physician Specialty 
 
EMR System  
 Physician Specialty Full EMR Partial EMR No EMR Total 
     General/Family 29% 15% 57% 39,920 
Internal medicine 24% 14% 62% 14,727 
Pediatrics 21% 15% 64% 18,243 
General Surgery 19% 19% 62% 6,364 
OBGYN 23% 16% 62% 11,475 
Orthopedic surgery 26% 20% 54% 8,509 
Cardiovascular Disease 31% 23% 45% 9,496 
Dermatology 19% 13% 68% 8,306 
Urology 26% 19% 54% 9,494 
Psychiatry 10% 12% 79% 8,244 
Neurology 20% 16% 64% 9,813 
Ophthalmology 15% 16% 70% 9,108 
Otolaryngology 25% 19% 56% 8,217 
All other 21% 20% 59% 14,053 
     Total 23% 16% 60% 175,969 
 
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flinn,	  	  	  29	  
Table 5: Variable Descriptions 
Short Name Variable Name Long Definition 
TIME Amount of time patient 
spent with physician 
TIME is a discrete variable measured in minutes that takes on 
values 0-240.  Time is recorded at the end of the visit by the 
physician.  
EMR Type of EMR system used 
by physician 
 EMR is a categorical variable that contains values 1=Full EMR 
System, 2=Partial EMR System, 3=No EMR System 
VYEAR Year of Visit VYEAR is a discrete variable that records the year the visit takes 
place.  It ranges from 2005-2009 
RACER Race of patient RACER is a categorical variable that records the race of the 
patient.  1=White, 2=Black, 3=Other.  
REGION Geographical region the 
visit took place 
REGION is a categorical variable that records the region of 
country where the visit took place.  1=Northeast, 2=Midwest, 
3=South, 4=West.  States included in the survey by region are as 
follows; Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Wisconsin, South: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West 
Virginia, West: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, 
Alaska, Hawaii. 
MAJOR Major reason for the 
patient's visit 
MAJOR is a categorical variable where 1=New Problem, 
2=Chronic Problem, Routine, 3=Chronic Problem, Flare-Up, 
4=Pre/Post Surgery, 5=Preventative Care (this includes yearly 
checkups and pre-natal care) 
PAYTYPE0 Patient's payment method 
for the visit 
PAYTYPE0 is a categorical variable that describes how the 
patient paid for the physician's services where 1=Private 
Insurance, 2=Medicare, 3=Medicaid, 4=Other, 5=Unknown 
RETYPOFF Type of office setting RETYPOFF is a categorical variable that describes the type of 
office the physician is operating in where 1= Private Solo/Group 
Practice, 2= Free Standing Urgent Care, 3= Community Health 
Center, 4=Other 
OWNS Ownership Status of the 
physician office 
OWNS is a categorical variable that measures the ownership 
status of the practice where the visit took place.  
1=Physician/Physician Group, 2=Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO), 3=Community Health Center, 
4=Medical/Academic Center, 5=Other 
AGE Age of patient AGE is a discrete variable ranging from 0-100 that describes the 
age of the patient.  Any patients falling under the age of 1 have 
an age recorded as 0. Any patients 100 or older have an age 
recorded as 100.  
SPECR Physician Specialty SPECR is a categorical variable that records the physician's 
specialty where 1=General/Family Doctor, 3=Internal Medicine, 
4=Pediatrics, 5= General Surgery, 6= OBGYN, 7= Orthopedic 
Surgery, 8= Cardiovascular Diseases, 9= Dermatology, 10= 
Urology, 11=Psychiatry, 12= Neurology, 13= Ophthalmology, 
14= Otolaryngology, 15= All Other 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics  
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
Time 20.57695 13.81688 0 240 
     Age 45.90116 24.66199 0 100 
     Year of Visit 2007.23 1.317808 2005 2009 
     Variable Percent 
 
Variable Percent 
Race 
  
Practice Ownership Status 
 White 83.23 
 
Physician/Physician Group 76.95 
Black 11.3 
 
HMO 2.17 
Other 5.46 
 
Community Health Center 9.94 
   
Medical/Academic Center 2.14 
Reason for Visit 
  
Other 8.79 
New Problem 32.28 
   Chronic, Routine 33.49 
 
Physician Specialty 
 Chronic, Flare-Up 8.85 
 
General/Family 22.72 
Pre/Post-Surgery 7.56 
 
Internal Medicine 8.31 
Preventative Care 17.81 
 
Pediatrics 10.42 
   
General Surgery 3.65 
Patient Payment Method 
  
OBGYN 6.55 
Private Insurance 49.82 
 
Orthopedic Surgery 4.87 
Medicare 23.38 
 
Cardiovascular Disease 5.37 
Medicaid 13.17 
 
Dermatology 4.7 
Other 9.55 
 
Urology 5.4 
Unknown 4.09 
 
Psychiatry 4.66 
   
Neurology 5.52 
Type of Office Setting 
  
Ophthalmology 5.19 
Private Solo/Group Practice 82.57 
 
Otolaryngology 4.7 
Free Standing Urgent Care 3.97 
 
All Other 7.94 
Community Health Center 10.17 
   Other 3.29 
    
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
N= 172,791  
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Table 7a: Regression of TIMEMD on EMR (and others) 
 
7b: lnTIMEMD on EMR (and others) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES timemd timemd timemd timemd lntimemd lntimemd lntimemd 
        
EMR 
       
Full EMR 0.233*** 0.763*** -0.717*** 
 
0.0173*** 0.0272*** 
 
 
(0.0797) (0.0806) (0.225) 
 
(0.00395) (0.00412) 
 
Partial EMR -0.0288 0.154* -1.196*** 
 
0.00879** 0.00684 
 
 
(0.0904) (0.0890) (0.219) 
 
(0.00444) (0.00439) 
 
VYEAR 
       
2006 
 
1.367*** 1.046*** 
  
0.0505*** 
 
  
(0.120) (0.146) 
  
(0.00581) 
 
2007 
 
0.339*** -0.191 
  
0.0104* 
 
  
(0.107) (0.128) 
  
(0.00569) 
 
2008 
 
1.070*** 0.467*** 
  
0.0575*** 
 
  
(0.0951) (0.115) 
  
(0.00505) 
 
2009 
 
0.138 -0.0467 
  
0.0134** 
 
  
(0.107) (0.139) 
  
(0.00573) 
 
VYEAR*EMR 
       
2005*Full EMR 
  
omitted -0.717*** 
  
-0.0387*** 
   
omitted (0.225) 
  
(0.0137) 
2005*Partial EMR 
  
omitted -1.196*** 
  
-0.0527*** 
   
omitted (0.219) 
  
(0.0124) 
2005*No EMR 
  
omitted omitted 
  
omitted 
   
omitted omitted 
  
omitted 
2006*Full EMR 
  
1.156*** 1.486*** 
  
0.0586*** 
   
(0.316) (0.208) 
  
(0.0111) 
2006*Partial EMR 
  
1.419*** 1.269*** 
  
0.0358*** 
   
(0.356) (0.271) 
  
(0.0132) 
2006*No EMR 
  
omitted 1.046*** 
  
0.0359*** 
   
omitted (.146) 
  
(0.00672) 
2007*Full EMR 
  
1.808*** 0.900*** 
  
0.0272*** 
   
(0.297) (0.195) 
  
(0.00985) 
2007*Partial EMR 
  
1.941*** 0.553** 
  
0.00852 
   
(0.313) (0.227) 
  
(0.0106) 
2007*No EMR 
  
omitted -0.191 
  
-0.00972 
   
omitted (0.128) 
  
(0.00677) 
2008*Full EMR 
  
2.180*** 1.930*** 
  
0.0796*** 
   
(0.263) (0.149) 
  
(0.00734) 
2008*Partial EMR 
  
1.580*** 0.850*** 
  
0.0547*** 
   
(0.257) (0.148) 
  
(0.00767) 
2008*No EMR 
  
omitted 0.467*** 
  
0.0333*** 
   
omitted (0.115) 
  
(0.00607) 
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2009*Full EMR 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
0.930*** 
(4) 
0.166 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
0.0191** 
   
(0.270) (0.142) 
  
(0.00797) 
2009*Partial EMR 
  
1.330*** 0.0874 
  
0.0148 
   
(0.296) (0.193) 
  
(0.00955) 
209*No EMR 
  
omitted -0.0467 
  
-0.00349 
   
omitted (0.139) 
  
(0.00728) 
REGION 
       
Midwest 
 
-1.788*** -1.762*** -1.762*** 
 
-0.0759*** -0.0748*** 
  
(0.0971) (0.0971) (0.0971) 
 
(0.00477) (0.00477) 
South 
 
-0.823*** -0.811*** -0.811*** 
 
-0.0433*** -0.0427*** 
  
(0.0940) (0.0940) (0.0940) 
 
(0.00444) (0.00444) 
West 
 
0.115 0.133 0.133 
 
0.00384 0.00495 
  
(0.104) (0.103) (0.103) 
 
(0.00488) (0.00488) 
RACER 
       
Black 
 
-0.176* -0.169* -0.169* 
 
-0.0128** -0.0126** 
  
(0.0999) (0.0998) (0.0998) 
 
(0.00527) (0.00527) 
Other 
 
0.132 0.129 0.129 
 
0.0290*** 0.0291*** 
  
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
 
(0.00655) (0.00656) 
SPECR 
       
Internal Medicine 
 
1.435*** 1.430*** 1.430*** 
 
0.0706*** 0.0706*** 
  
(0.116) (0.117) (0.117) 
 
(0.00640) (0.00640) 
Pediatrics 
 
-0.860*** -0.834*** -0.834*** 
 
-0.0176** -0.0167** 
  
(0.123) (0.122) (0.122) 
 
(0.00686) (0.00686) 
General Surgery 
 
1.413*** 1.432*** 1.432*** 
 
0.0873*** 0.0878*** 
  
(0.189) (0.189) (0.189) 
 
(0.00853) (0.00854) 
OBGYN 
 
-1.021*** -1.011*** -1.011*** 
 
-0.0283*** -0.0284*** 
  
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
 
(0.00761) (0.00762) 
Orthopedic Surgery 
 
-0.421*** -0.433*** -0.433*** 
 
-0.0123 -0.0127 
  
(0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
 
(0.00799) (0.00799) 
Cardiovascular Disease 
 
0.831*** 0.840*** 0.840*** 
 
0.0562*** 0.0565*** 
  
(0.137) (0.137) (0.137) 
 
(0.00787) (0.00787) 
Dernatology 
 
-1.363*** -1.350*** -1.350*** 
 
-0.0855*** -0.0854*** 
  
(0.172) (0.172) (0.172) 
 
(0.00790) (0.00789) 
Urology 
 
0.623*** 0.630*** 0.630*** 
 
0.0417*** 0.0419*** 
  
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
 
(0.00761) (0.00763) 
Psychiatry 
 
15.42*** 15.41*** 15.41*** 
 
0.549*** 0.549*** 
  
(0.212) (0.212) (0.212) 
 
(0.0100) (0.0100) 
Neurology 
 
9.655*** 9.682*** 9.682*** 
 
0.376*** 0.377*** 
  
(0.198) (0.198) (0.198) 
 
(0.00809) (0.00812) 
Ophthalmology 
 
0.0250 0.0555 0.0555 
 
0.0240*** 0.0249*** 
  
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
 
(0.00719) (0.00719) 
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Otolaryngology 
(1) 
 
(2) 
0.448*** 
(3) 
0.473*** 
(4) 
0.473*** 
(5) (6) 
0.0515*** 
(7) 
0.0521*** 
  
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) 
 
(0.00765) (0.00764) 
All Other  
 
5.511*** 5.511*** 5.511*** 
 
0.180*** 0.180*** 
  
(0.184) (0.184) (0.184) 
 
(0.00763) (0.00763) 
PAYTYPE0 
       
Medicare 
 
-0.583*** -0.579*** -0.579*** 
 
-0.0288*** -0.0289*** 
  
(0.0975) (0.0975) (0.0975) 
 
(0.00474) (0.00474) 
Medicaid 
 
-0.443*** -0.451*** -0.451*** 
 
-0.0272*** -0.0276*** 
  
(0.0976) (0.0977) (0.0977) 
 
(0.00533) (0.00533) 
Other 
 
1.416*** 1.417*** 1.417*** 
 
0.0148** 0.0147** 
  
(0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
 
(0.00639) (0.00639) 
Unknown 
 
1.357*** 1.332*** 1.332*** 
 
0.00202 0.00128 
  
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246) 
 
(0.00889) (0.00890) 
MAJOR 
       
Chronic, Routine 
 
-1.050*** -1.049*** -1.049*** 
 
-0.0449*** -0.0448*** 
  
(0.0868) (0.0868) (0.0868) 
 
(0.00421) (0.00421) 
Chronic, Flare-Up 
 
1.000*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 
 
0.0600*** 0.0600*** 
  
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
 
(0.00565) (0.00565) 
Pre/Post Surgery 
 
-1.994*** -2.005*** -2.005*** 
 
-0.105*** -0.106*** 
  
(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) 
 
(0.00658) (0.00658) 
Preventative Care 
 
0.726*** 0.722*** 0.722*** 
 
0.0155*** 0.0154*** 
  
(0.0903) (0.0903) (0.0903) 
 
(0.00517) (0.00517) 
OWNS 
       
Health Maintenance Org. 
 
0.776*** 0.784*** 0.784*** 
 
0.0650*** 0.0663*** 
  
(0.217) (0.217) (0.217) 
 
(0.0107) (0.0107) 
Community Health Center 
 
-0.188* -0.170 -0.170 
 
0.0449*** 0.0457*** 
  
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
 
(0.00601) (0.00601) 
Medical/Academic Center 0.311 0.340 0.340 
 
0.0489*** 0.0495*** 
  
(0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
 
(0.00974) (0.00975) 
Other 
 
-0.0868 -0.0754 -0.0754 
 
0.0115* 0.0119** 
  
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
 
(0.00593) (0.00593) 
AGE 
 
0.0229*** 0.0229*** 0.0229*** 
 
0.00137*** 0.00137*** 
  
(0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00206) 
 
(0.000101) (0.000101) 
Constant 20.52*** 17.90*** 18.24*** 18.24*** 2.886*** 2.770*** 2.785*** 
 
(0.0432) (0.146) (0.152) (0.152) (0.00210) (0.00789) (0.00818) 
        
Observations 175,969 172,791 172,791 172,791 175,969 172,791 172,791 
R-squared 0.0001 0.093 0.094 0.094 0.000 0.054 0.054 
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
N=172,791 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base variables: EMEDREC-No EMR system, REGION-Northeast, RACER-White, SPECR- General/Family, PAYTYPE0- Private insurance, 
MAJOR-New health problem, OWNS- Physician/Physician Group 
Models 1-4 are OLS models that regress patient visit time on EMR and other control variables.  Model 2 is the baseline model.  Models5-7 are 
OLS models that regress the natural log of patient visit time on EMR and other control variables.  Model 6 is the baseline model.  
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Table 8: Probit results on any, full, and partial EMR systems 
VARIABLES EMRA EMRF EMRP 
    SPECR 
   Internal Medicine -0.0923*** -0.134*** 0.0356** 
 
(0.0130) (0.0142) (0.0155) 
Pediatrics -0.196*** -0.272*** 0.0529*** 
 
(0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0143) 
General Surgery -0.0715*** -0.331*** 0.267*** 
 
(0.0185) (0.0206) (0.0204) 
OBGYN -0.109*** -0.230*** 0.125*** 
 
(0.0144) (0.0159) (0.0171) 
Orthopedic Surgery 0.168*** -0.0457*** 0.326*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0173) (0.0183) 
Cardiovascular Disease 0.346*** 0.0613*** 0.437*** 
 
(0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0172) 
Dernatology -0.312*** -0.405*** -0.00334 
 
(0.0169) (0.0192) (0.0199) 
Urology 0.135*** -0.0545*** 0.283*** 
 
(0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0178) 
Psychiatry -0.534*** -0.628*** -0.118*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0236) (0.0212) 
Neurology -0.110*** -0.257*** 0.140*** 
 
(0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0182) 
Ophthalmology -0.317*** -0.545*** 0.147*** 
 
(0.0164) (0.0191) (0.0187) 
Otolaryngology 0.0396** -0.151*** 0.264*** 
 
(0.0166) (0.0184) (0.0188) 
All Other  0.00976 -0.225*** 0.286*** 
 
(0.0136) (0.0151) (0.0155) 
REGION 
   Midwest -0.0285*** 0.0121 -0.0558*** 
 
(0.00998) (0.0111) (0.0115) 
South 0.0111 0.0583*** -0.0396*** 
 
(0.00909) (0.0102) (0.0104) 
West 0.252*** 0.187*** 0.156*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
VYEAR 
   2006 0.0675*** 0.199*** -0.0872*** 
 
(0.0120) (0.0142) (0.0140) 
2007 0.408*** 0.503*** 0.0517*** 
 
(0.0120) (0.0139) (0.0137) 
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    (1)     (2)     (3) 
2008 0.662*** 0.735*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0122) 
2009 0.809*** 0.888*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0135) (0.0133) 
OWNS 
   Health Maintenance Org. 1.109*** 1.087*** -0.218*** 
 
(0.0342) (0.0302) (0.0330) 
Community Health Center 0.389*** 0.193*** 0.356*** 
 
(0.0378) (0.0328) (0.0447) 
Medical/Academic Center 0.0294 0.116*** -0.0877*** 
 
(0.0235) (0.0251) (0.0281) 
Other 0.409*** 0.328*** 0.211*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0135) 
RETYPOFF 
   Free Standing Urgent Care 0.213*** 0.0969*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0186) 
Community Health Center -0.328*** -0.294*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.0375) (0.0324) (0.0449) 
Other 0.671*** 0.382*** 0.356*** 
 
(0.0247) (0.0239) (0.0253) 
EBILLREC 
   Full e-billing 0.806*** 0.919*** 0.178*** 
 
(0.0133) (0.0164) (0.0148) 
Partial e-billing 0.501*** 0.310*** 0.400*** 
 
(0.0141) (0.0176) (0.0154) 
ECONR 
   E-Mail Consults -0.0122*** -0.0286*** 0.0225*** 
 
(0.00203) (0.00214) (0.00251) 
Constant -1.483*** -1.981*** -1.487*** 
 
(0.0183) (0.0218) (0.0205) 
    Observations 168,251 168,251 168,251 
 
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
N=163,961 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base variables: REGION-Northeast, RACER-White, SPECR- General/Family, OWNS- Physician/Physician Group, RETYPOFF- Private 
Solo/Group Practice, No electronic billing 
EMRP= Partial EMR system, EMRF=Full EMR system, EMRA=Either partial or full EMR system 
Note: Pr(LHS=1)=ϕ(RHS) 
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Table 9: IV 2SLS with EMR as instrumented variable 
  
 
OLS IV with 2SLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ln(time) ln(time) ln(time) ln(time)  
     EMRA 0.0169*** -0.242*** -0.239*** -0.581*** 
 
(0.00346) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.224) 
VYEAR 
    2006 0.0519*** 0.0573*** 0.0572*** 0.0643*** 
 
(0.00582) (0.00588) (0.00588) (0.00776) 
2007 0.00813 0.0355*** 0.0352*** 0.0714*** 
 
(0.00576) (0.00622) (0.00621) (0.0246) 
2008 0.0588*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.173*** 
 
(0.00509) (0.00637) (0.00638) (0.0431) 
2009 0.0132** 0.0773*** 0.0766*** 0.161*** 
 
(0.00576) (0.00773) (0.00774) (0.0558) 
REGION 
    Midwest -0.0774*** -0.0817*** -0.0817*** -0.0874*** 
 
(0.00483) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00653) 
South -0.0461*** -0.0424*** -0.0424*** -0.0375*** 
 
(0.00448) (0.00457) (0.00457) (0.00575) 
West 0.00409 0.0254*** 0.0252*** 0.0533*** 
 
(0.00497) (0.00534) (0.00534) (0.0190) 
RACE 
    Black -0.0159*** -0.0252*** -0.0251*** -0.0373*** 
 
(0.00535) (0.00548) (0.00548) (0.00984) 
Other 0.0275*** 0.0249*** 0.0249*** 0.0215*** 
 
(0.00677) (0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00778) 
MAJOR 
    Chronic, Routine -0.0442*** -0.0475*** -0.0475*** -0.0519*** 
 
(0.00428) (0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00553) 
Chronic, Flare-Up 0.0610*** 0.0586*** 0.0586*** 0.0553*** 
 
(0.00573) (0.00586) (0.00585) (0.00666) 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.104*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.0992*** 
 
(0.00669) (0.00680) (0.00679) (0.00752) 
Preventative Care 0.0175*** 0.0200*** 0.0199*** 0.0232*** 
 
(0.00525) (0.00534) (0.00533) (0.00608) 
SPECR 
    Internal Medicine 0.0737*** 0.0657*** 0.0658*** 0.0552*** 
 
(0.00648) (0.00667) (0.00667) (0.0100) 
Pediatrics -0.0226*** -0.0387*** -0.0385*** -0.0598*** 
 
(0.00695) (0.00719) (0.00719) (0.0158) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
General Surgery 0.0826*** 0.0768*** 0.0769*** 0.0692*** 
 
(0.00862) (0.00875) (0.00874) (0.0106) 
OBGYN -0.0350*** -0.0467*** -0.0466*** -0.0620*** 
 
(0.00778) (0.00795) (0.00794) (0.0132) 
Orthopedic Surgery -0.0146* 0.00349 0.00330 0.0272 
 
(0.00806) (0.00829) (0.00828) (0.0180) 
Cardiovascular Disease 0.0549*** 0.0938*** 0.0934*** 0.145*** 
 
(0.00796) (0.00866) (0.00866) (0.0348) 
Dermatology -0.0882*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.150*** 
 
(0.00799) (0.00843) (0.00842) (0.0248) 
Urology 0.0375*** 0.0533*** 0.0532*** 0.0740*** 
 
(0.00774) (0.00792) (0.00791) (0.0163) 
Psychiatry 0.545*** 0.497*** 0.497*** 0.433*** 
 
(0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0431) 
Neurology 0.375*** 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.352*** 
 
(0.00824) (0.00847) (0.00847) (0.0125) 
Ophthalmology 0.0236*** -0.00239 -0.00211 -0.0365 
 
(0.00727) (0.00772) (0.00772) (0.0241) 
Otolaryngology 0.0462*** 0.0544*** 0.0543*** 0.0652*** 
 
(0.00788) (0.00799) (0.00799) (0.0111) 
All Other  0.179*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 
 
(0.00773) (0.00785) (0.00785) (0.00833) 
PAYTYPE0 
    Medicare -0.0303*** -0.0331*** -0.0331*** -0.0369*** 
 
(0.00482) (0.00491) (0.00491) (0.00579) 
Medicaid -0.0285*** -0.0361*** -0.0360*** -0.0460*** 
 
(0.00540) (0.00553) (0.00553) (0.00883) 
Other 0.0166** 0.00707 0.00717 -0.00547 
 
(0.00651) (0.00662) (0.00662) (0.0109) 
Unknown 0.00186 0.0344*** 0.0341*** 0.0772*** 
 
(0.00911) (0.00955) (0.00955) (0.0298) 
OWNS 
    Health Maintenance Org. 0.0742*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.347*** 
 
(0.0115) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.103) 
Community Health Center 0.0440*** 0.0513*** 0.0512*** 0.0608*** 
 
(0.00614) (0.00626) (0.00626) (0.00914) 
Medical/Academic Center 0.0459*** 0.0616*** 0.0615*** 0.0823*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0178) 
Other 0.00651 0.0519*** 0.0514*** 0.111*** 
 
(0.00604) (0.00711) (0.00711) (0.0399) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
AGE 0.00136*** 0.00137*** 0.00137*** 0.00138*** 
 
(0.000102) (0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000112) 
Constant 2.774*** 2.837*** 2.836*** 2.920*** 
 
(0.00796) (0.00941) (0.00941) (0.0556) 
     Observations 168,251 168,251 168,251 168,251 
R-squared 0.055 0.023 0.024 
  
All data from NAMCS 2005-2010 data sets 
N=168,251 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Base variables: REGION-Northeast, RACER-White, SPECR- General/Family, PAYTYPE0- Private insurance, MAJOR-New health problem, 
OWNS- Physician/Physician Group 
The variable EMRA is a dummy variable =1 if EMR= 1 or 2 (either a full or partial EMR system is in place) 
Model 1 is an OLS model of ln(TIME+1) on EMRA and a set of controls 
Model 2 is an IV 2SLS where instrumented: EMRA, instruments: year, race, region, speciality, major, payment, ownership, age, e-billing, and e-
mail consultation variables 
Model 3 is an IV 2SLS like model 2, except the e-mail consultation variable is not used as an instrument 
Model 4 is an IV 2SLS like model 2, except the e-billing variables are left out 
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